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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has proven itself the premier fighting force in the world. In Panama, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, American forces moved with speed and agility, crushing enemy forces. However, victory in combat is only a penultimate step in the larger task of "winning the peace." Winning the peace involves aligning the "hearts and minds" of a people with American political objectives, thus creating a politically and economically stable nation friendly to U.S. interests. However, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), America's ability to win the peace is in doubt. While even critics of OIF recognize its military brilliance, the peace-winning efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) have come under intense criticism. U.S. forces are struggling to balance the doctrinal principles of security and legitimacy. Furthermore, they are doing it without a strong doctrinal foundation that prescribes important post-war practices. Consequently, victory appears distant, despite President Bush's declaration of the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Coalition forces continue to encounter resistance. This, however, is not surprising. Undeniably, U.S. efforts are handicapped. Winning the peace in Iraq has been elusive because of a failure to win Iraqi hearts and minds, friction between security and legitimacy, and a failure of doctrine to underscore important post-war practices.
Winning Hearts and Minds
Many roadblocks exist to winning hearts and minds in post-war Iraq: the most important is American ethnocentrism. U.S. soldiers and statesmen generally lack understanding of the Arab worldview. "[The U.S. is] at a huge disadvantage," says Michael Nacht, Dean of the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley.
1 Part of America's inability to persuade the Iraqis derives from their very foreignness and America's inability to fully understand their psychology. Only Arabs fully understand their own paradigm, but cultural training could help American occupiers to be more attuned to Arab sensibilities.
Regrettably, many U.S. soldiers in theater received little or no cultural training before deploying, and linguists are in short supply. This lack of cultural training is prevalent even among Army PSYOP forces, which are broadcasting messages to the population via leaflet and loud- only thing that will convince them that their lives are better. 7 That is why the CPA is striving to provide basic services such as water, gas, electricity, and security so quickly. Shortcomings in these areas not only hurt Iraqis; they also attract the attention of the world media.
The international news media is a third party in the information campaign in Iraq, and as interlocutors between the CPA and the people, they are an additional source of friction in win- This progress is encouraging, but it is only the beginning. The CPA must do more than provide services and repair infrastructure; it must also establish a secure environment for both coalition soldiers and the Iraqi people.
Friction Between Security and Legitimacy
The military battle for security in Iraq often conflicts with the information battle for legitimacy. While one can debate whether current operations in Iraq should be classified as a war or a military operation other than war (MOOTW), principles of the latter provide a good lens for analysis, and the principles of legitimacy and security are of particular interest in this case. Joint Publication 3-0 defines security in MOOTW as the ability to "never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage." 9 Implied in this definition are the soldier's duties of selfdefense and the protection of noncombatants. In Iraq this means not only defensive force protection, but also offensive operations to forestall terrorist or guerrilla attacks. Legitimacy is the ability to "sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the government to govern." 10 In Iraq, the battle for legitimacy is compounded because the U.S. forces are fighting to gain or maintain legitimacy in the eyes of three different constituencies: the international community, the American people, and the Iraqi people. The need for both legitimacy and security in Iraq is undeniable-and perhaps paradoxical.
The friction between security and legitimacy exists in the transition phase in Iraq because it has proven extremely difficult to provide security against guerrilla attacks. In order to quell guerrilla resistance, the military's response to sniper shootings or random bombings has been conventional: "American troops raid homes in broad sweeps, arresting anyone caught in their net," 11 but this tactic invariably leads to the arrest of many innocent Iraqi civilians, people who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. The soldier's natural focus on security leads coalition forces to treat apprehended Iraqi civilians as captured insurgents until they can distinguish them. Two examples illustrate the point. When U.S. soldiers raided the house of a suspected Hussein loyalist, they showed up with 120 soldiers, six helicopters, and several tanks. In the end, the soldiers left with over 70 men and boys, many handcuffed and hooded; most had been wrestled or shoved to the ground in front of other family members. After ten days of questioning, the sheik and his family were released with an apology and a request for help in the fu- the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people and ultimately winning the peace, then the trade-off of legitimacy for security might be worth the risk. After all, the ultimate objective of war is to bend the opponent to one's will, and the state readily accepts the possibility of casualties when it wields force to do that.
However, when waging an information war, attacking the "enemy" with information instead of force, willingness to accept casualties in pursuit of victory seems to wane. When told to "take the hill," commanders don't refuse the mission because they expect to take casualties.
Casualties are an unfortunate but expected part of a shooting war, and it is the commander's job to accomplish the mission while minimizing casualties, but in MOOTW the balance between casualties and mission success is especially obscure. At the end of an information campaign one can't claim victory by standing on top of the hill, yet the commander's responsibilities remain the same-to accomplish the mission. However, without a clear balance between mission success and casualties, commanders find it justifiably difficult to put their soldiers in harm's way. Clausewitz categorizes the state at war into three components: "the military power, the country, and the will of the enemy." 17 In modern terms, Clausewitz's "country" includes the infrastructure of government, and the "enemy" includes the people of the state. This then is the famous Clausewitzian "trinity" of the state, and in planning the campaign, U.S. planners separated one leg of the trinity from the others. Yet if one is to believe Clausewitz, each of the three legs of the trinity must submit to one's will before hostilities will end. This is not to advocate attacking noncombatants, but it does mean that influencing the people can't be taken for granted as a result of attacking the other two legs of the trinity, and it also means that influencing the national will can't be deferred to the last phase. While the coalition planned for the doctrinal tran- laments the lack of security, and indirectly suggests the informational or psychological effect needed. It concedes that the coalition force is considerable, but charges, "It is not visible enough at the street level." 21 Under these circumstances, it is understandable if some Iraqis either fight alongside the guerrillas or passively support them.
Another facet of reconciliation that is missing from U.S. doctrine is the traditional act of surrender. The act of surrender is important in persuading a people to fulfill their obligations under occupation, and must be planned for continuously, without waiting for the military decision. Joint doctrine says, "Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination." 22 Termination must be a deliberate rather than a hasty politico-military operation, and it may even require preserving part of the enemy's government for that purpose. Granted, a surrender ceremony was made difficult by Saddam's flight into hiding. That made it harder to identify anyone willing to represent Iraq, but a surrender ceremony, even if conducted by relatively low-level officials of the defeated government, is not even included in U.S. definitions of transition or termination. In a war where regime change is the objective, a surrender ceremony formally transfers custody of some or all of a nation's sovereignty from the enemy government to the occupier. Such a symbolic maneuver is an important step in winning the information war in transition, but it must be a consideration in planning for decisive operations.
The United States also made surrender more difficult by criminalizing most members of the Ba'athist regime before victory-exemplified by the famous deck of playing cards. Even in a war with one of the most inarguably evil regimes in history, the Allies accepted the surrenders of leading Nazi officers at the end of World War II. The Nazi government was either dead or in
hiding, yet the Allies accepted the surrender of the German military. Afterwards the victors indeed prosecuted Admiral Doenitz and his colleagues for war crimes, but until surrender ceremonies were complete, they were treated as the custodians of German sovereignty. Planning for regime change should continuously identify prospective custodians within the enemy government, and operations should actively preserve the ability of the enemy to surrender. Surrender, the last public act of the old regime, makes it more difficult for "dead-enders" to sustain resistance, and demonstrates a "due process" approach to ending hostilities. This is important be- To gain and maintain the initiative in persuading the populace of the defeated state, the United States should have planned for immediate, massive "informational assistance" in the transition phase, just as it planned for large-scale humanitarian assistance. The CSIS reconstruction assessment characterizes the communication between the CPA and Iraqis as "insufficient," and it calls for "drastic changes . . . to immediately improve the daily flow of practical information to the Iraqi people, principally through enhanced radio and TV programming." 24 In earlier phases of the war, the United Stayes had planned for a Ba'athist scorched-earth campaign, with flaming oil fields, blown bridges, and thousands of displaced and starving persons. The coalition stockpiled medical supplies, food, and water for the noncombatants. It made prudent provisions for a disaster that largely didn't happen, but it has apparently failed to make the same provisions for information, overestimating the survivability of Iraqi information systems and failing to quickly install Iraqi news media beyond sporadic TV transmissions, leaflet drops, and COMMANDO SOLO broadcasts. The coalition failed to quickly hire and train Iraqis to run the TV and radio broadcasts, purchase equipment, or manage the distribution of quality print media. The CSIS report points out that the CPA could have hired "a large number of Iraqi 'animators' to carry and receive messages" even before the war started. 25 Instead, the CPA is scrambling to bolster its communications several weeks after large-scale fighting has ended. While the CPA will probably make up the difference, the coalition forces failed to include enough informational resources in their initial deployments. That was due in part to the decisive operations tunnel-vision already described, but informational assistance gets scant attention in the doctrinal concept of transition.
Material assistance dominates, as it probably should, but U.S. doctrine should include planning for staging informational forces in Phases I-III in the same way that it considers combat or logistical forces.
CONCLUSION
Lawrence Di Rita, a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, sums up one of the lessons of OIF this way: "We've always thought of post-hostilities as a phase [distinct from combat] . . . . The future of war is that these things are going to be much more of a continuum."
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The challenge for the United States and the CPA is to change their thoughts and doctrine, to approach post-hostilities along such a continuum. That requires a reexamination of campaign phasing as well as the principles of war and MOOTW, refining those phases and principles to fully incorporate post-hostilities and nation-building activities. In the end, such a revision could very well result in the elimination of the principles of MOOTW or their combination with the principles of war. As discussed, influencing all of the sources of an enemy's will cannot be put off to the last phase of a military operation. As the one remaining superpower, America's influence is great, but the U.S. national security establishment must apply that influence coherently throughout the continuum of pre-hostilities, combat, and post-hostilities. Someday, the United States will again inherit or create another obligation as it has in Iraq, and when that happens, it must be better prepared to fulfill that obligation.
